HAZOP Study EPIC for Cooling water system, Flow meter, Pipelines, Degassing stations, & Water treatment plant facilities of Qatar Energy

iFluids Engineering and Consultancy WLL was awarded to perform HAZOP study for EPIC various facilities of Qatar Energy including :

• HAZOP Study EPIC for Common cooling water system at RLIC
• HAZOP Study EPIC for upgradation of existing orifice type flow meter and ultrasonic flow meter at Station-N of Qatar energy.
• HAZOP Study for the existing 3” pipeline between NGL Complex and QPR
• HAZOP Study EPIC for degassing stations to utilize produced water from storage tanks in Dukhan , Qatar Energy
• HAZOP  For Engineering EPIC Of New Effluent Water Treatment Plant For NGL At Mesaieed

What is HAZOP Study?

A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study is a methodical and organized assessment carried out on an existing or planned operation. Its primary objective is to systematically identify and assess potential hazards at different phases of a process, spanning from the design stage to actual operation.

Case Study 1 – HAZOP Study EPIC for Common Cooling Water System at RLIC

• Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLC) Expansion
  • RLC has rapidly expanded with industrial facilities over the years.
  • Further expansion planned with new industrial facilities to boost hydrocarbon output in Qatar.
• Water Supply for RLC Master Plan
  • RLC supplies seawater for cooling, desalinated water for processes, potable water, and backup firewater network to end users.
• North Field Expansion (NFE) Project
  • Qatar Petroleum (QP) is developing the NFE Project to enhance hydrocarbon output.
  • Project aligns with Qatar Vision 2030 and will be located near future petrochemical facilities.
• Meeting Water Demand for NFE and Future Petrochemical Plant
  • QP plans to implement the Common Cooling Water System (CCWS) for the NFE Project.
  • Supplied seawater will be processed by a common RO plant, providing desalinated water for cooling towers and other uses.
• Project Objective
  • Extend seawater supply and return headers for NFE Project’s common RO plant.
  • Install main cooling water pumps at the existing Pump House (PH).
  • Ensure provisions are in place for end users.

Case study 2 – HAZOP Study EPIC for upgradation of existing Orifice type flow meter and Ultrasonic flow meter at Station-N of Qatar Energy.

• The existing Orifice type flow meter and Ultrasonic flow meter at Station-N require upgrade to custody transfer and allocation type flow meters respectively.
• The project encompasses a broad range of objectives and activities.
  • Replacement of orifice type flow meter
  • Replacement of ultrasonic flow meter
• Hence the above-mentioned scope was taken as the Nodes and Conducted HAZOP Study.

Case study 3 – HAZOP Study for the Existing 3” Pipeline between NGL Complex and QPR

• QP Refinery (QPR) supplies certified on-spec LPG product from LPG spheres located at QPR to WOQOD LPG bottling facility which is in Industrial Area – Doha (SAMI) approximately 32 km from QPR.
• To cater shortage of LPG in local market, Make-up Butane is currently imported from NGL-1 run-down via existing 3” pipeline between NGL Complex and QPR. This existing 3” pipeline is also used to supply Butane during QPR turnarounds.
• However, as per current high demand of LPG in local market, existing 3” pipeline cannot supply the required LPG demand.
• Thus, for the above-mentioned facility Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study was carried out.

Case study 4 – HAZOP Study EPIC for Degassing Stations to Utilize Produced Water from Storage Tanks in Dukhan , Qatar Energy

• Location of Dukhan Field: Situated 80 km west of Doha on Qatar’s western and eastern coasts, covering 65 km by 5–12 km with oil, gas, and water injection wells.
• Production Zones: Divided into six zones – Gas Recycling Plant-Arab D, Khatiyah, Dukhan Township, Fahahil, Jaleha, and Diyab.
• Main Degassing Stations: Khatiyah Main Degassing Station (KMDS), Fahahil Main Degassing Station (FMDS), and Jaleha Degassing Station (JDS) are crucial for processing and storing crude oil.
• Stabilized Crude Oil Process: Oil from KMDS, FMDS, and JDS undergoes dewatering and settling in Crude Oil Storage Tanks (COST) before being pumped to Mesaieed via Um Bab.
• Produced Water Management: Produced water from COSTs at KMDS, FMDS, and JDS is currently discharged into wells connected to the Umm-Er Dhuma aquifer.
• Qatar Energy’s Objective: Aims to recover produced water to prevent groundwater contamination by stopping its disposal into wells.
• Produced Water Treatment Plan: Collected water will be stored in an underground tank, transferred to a Produced Water Secondary Treatment (PWST) unit, and then used for injection.
• KMDS Processing Role: KMDS handles fluids from Arab C, Arab D, and Uwainat oil reservoirs.
• FMDS Location and Function: Situated centrally within Dukhan Fields, it processes well fluids from Fahahil North, Fahahil South, and Arab fields.
• JDS Location and Role: Located 35 km from Dukhan and 10 km from Umm Bab cement works, JDS receives well fluids from the Arab C and Arab D reservoirs, including some piped in from the Diyab manifold.
• Separation Process: Four stages of separation at degassing stations result in:
  • Degassed crude oil
  • Rich associated gas (RAG)
  • Produced water
• Stabilized Crude Oil Storage and Transport: Degassed crude oil is stabilized, stored in COST, and then pumped to the Umm Bab Booster Station for transport to Mesaieed.
• Further Processing at COST: Crude undergoes dewatering and desalting procedures at the COST.
• RAG Handling: Rich associated gas is dehydrated and exported for gas lift or further processing at the FSP.
• Produced Water Treatment: Produced water is treated with a water treatment unit (Hydro-cyclone and Degasser) and sent to the PWI system via PW transfer pumps. If PWI is unavailable, water is disposed of in disposal wells.
• DPFU Project Goal: Plans to install a new PWST to shift from disposal well routing to collected water treatment and PW injection, utilizing a new PW Collection Tank and PW Secondary Treatment section for degassing.

Case study 5 – HAZOP Study for Engineering EPIC Of New Effluent Water Treatment Plant for NGL at Mesaieed

• Objective of Safety Measures
  • Ensure safety measures to prevent, control, and mitigate hazards and operability issues.
  • Aim to minimize risks to ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) levels.
• HAZOP Workshop Documentation
  • Proceedings documented using PHA Pro software.
  • Followed the latest guidelines and templates from Qatar Energy.
• Workshop Execution
  • Conducted via screen sharing, enabling active participation.
  • Participants contributed insights to align with workshop objectives.
• NGL Complex Effluent Wastewater
  • NGL Complex (NGL-1/2/3/4 Plants) at Mesaieed Industrial City generates effluent wastewater and surface run-off.
  • No wastewater treatment facilities in NGL-1/2 Plants.
  • Limited treatment facilities in NGL 3 and 4 Plants; treated wastewater is currently discharged into the sea.
• MME Regulation Compliance
  • MME regulations prohibit discharge of treated wastewater into the marine environment.
  • Treated water will be reused for irrigation and landscaping within NGL facilities.
• Proposed New Effluent Water Treatment Plant (NEWTP)
  • NEWTP is proposed to treat effluents from NGL Plants to meet irrigation water quality standards.
• FEED Phase Completion
  • FEED phase completed by another contractor.
  • Included tasks: identifying effluent sources, designing collection and transfer systems, and developing a new effluent treatment facility to ensure compliance with irrigation standards.
• Project Objectives
  • Establish an Effluent Water Treatment Plant for the NGL complex.
  • Cover collection and transfer systems and reuse treated water for irrigation.
  • Ensure compliance with MME requirements, CTO regulations, and KAHRAMAA standards.
  • Address boiler blowdown quenching to prevent high TDS in effluent water.
• HAZOP Workshop Compliance
  • Conducted per Qatar Energy’s Corporate Standard and Guidelines.
  • Currently covers OSBL (Outside Battery Limits) facilities.
  • Will be updated for NEWTP facilities in future workshops.

HAZOP Methodology

• The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study is a methodical and organized assessment of a proposed or current operation, aimed at detecting and assessing potential hazards in both the design and operation phases.
• This study is conducted by a group of engineers with diverse expertise.
• The team conducts a comprehensive examination of individual segments of a plant, system, or operation, commonly referred to as nodes.
• They evaluate the likelihood of any deviations from the intended operation and assess their potential consequences in light of any existing safeguards.
• The assessment of the impact of identified hazards on safety, assets, and the environment is conducted.
• The HAZOP methodology is a brainstorming technique that is driven by the use of guidewords.
• The team members make contributions based on their combined experience and knowledge gained from previous projects.
• The HAZOP analysis procedure documents the hazards that have been identified, refraining from suggesting any solutions unless a clear solution presents itself.
• Potential resolutions could comprise supplementary measures or functional protocols as deemed essential.
• The study record functions as a tool for identifying the Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) concerns that require resolution throughout the project.
• The objectives of the HAZOP study are:
  • The task at hand involves the identification and assessment of potential hazards and risks that may be linked to process facilities.
  • Identify operability and maintenance issues
  • Comprehend these perils/challenges and assess their probable outcomes.
  • Propose supplementary measures or protocols as deemed essential.
• These steps will lead to a better design/ operation of the facility to mitigate the potential hazards identified.
  • Following are the documents required:
    • Project and Facility Description
    • Facility Layout Drawings
    • Process Flow Diagrams
    • Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams
    • Cause & Effect Matrix
    • Hazardous Area Classification Drawings
    • The document pertains to the guidelines, operating procedures, and health, safety, and environmental (HSE) philosophies of the company.
    • Incident reports
    • Facility Risk Register
• The HAZOP analysis proceeds systematically by examining each node of the plant in succession. The Facilitator makes the selection of the node sizes and the route through the plant before the study. The node ought to be explicated in terms of:
• Brief description of the node
• Typical operating and design conditions
• Guidewords refer to uncomplicated terms or expressions utilized to specify or measure the purpose and related parameters, with the aim of proposing deviations.
  • No, Low/ Less, More/ High, Reverse/ Misdirected, Less/ More.
• Typical parameters/elements considered for HAZOP are as follows
  • Flow, Pressure, Temperature, Level, Viscosity
  • Composition, Contamination
  • Operation, Start-up, Shutdown, Maintenance, Isolation
  • Sampling
  • Corrosion
  • Operability & Maintenance Issues
  • Safety
  • Instrumentation & Control
• Deviation refers to the instances where the process design intent is not followed.  
• The combination of parameters and guidewords in sequence are identified all the deviations (no flow, more temperature etc.).
• It is possible that there exists a noteworthy degree of overlap among the deviations under consideration, such as the possibility that the absence of flow could produce an effect equivalent to that of increased pressure.
• The team will engage in a collaborative process of ideation to identify all plausible factors contributing to the observed deviation.
• All potential causes should be identified and discussed, as the consequences and actions may be different.
• Causes are always local or within the node only.
• If possible, it has been consolidated and limited to the node under discussion.
• There exist three primary classifications of causes, ranked in descending order of likelihood:
  • Human error
  • Equipment failure
  • External events
• It may be noted that “cause” in worksheet is explicitly worded including one tag.
• This implies/ includes other corresponding tags for parallel equipment.
• The potential consequences for each cause are discussed and assessed within the limits of the information available and the expertise of the team.
• There may be several consequences involving escalation to other pieces of equipment.
• All important consequences anywhere in the facility, resulting from the cause are listed out. Worst-case consequences are described assuming that no safeguards are in place or working.
• Controls that prevent the cause from occurring, and/ or alert the Operator when deviations occur, and/ or mitigate the consequences should the cause occur are known as “safeguards”.

They include, for example:

• Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures, which are designed to prevent a catastrophic release of hazardous or flammable material.
• Those systems are specifically engineered to identify and provide timely notification subsequent to the onset of a hazardous or combustible substance discharge.
• The aforementioned refers to the set of protocols or documented measures that serve to alleviate the impact of a hazardous or flammable substance discharge.

• It is further noted that, positive isolation procedure is followed while handling over any facility for maintenance work such as control valve maintenance, which requires breaking the flange, etc.
• Once the key safeguards are listed, the team then evaluates the listed Safeguards based on adequacy to eliminate or maintain the potential risks within tolerable limits.
• During the HAZOP session, the study team engaged in a systematic brainstorming process to evaluate the process under review in the scheduled meeting.
• This was accomplished through the use of a set of Guidewords, which were employed to structure the review.
• The study team is composed of individuals representing a variety of departments/specialties.
  • The following procedure is adopted during the workshop:
    • Selecting a Node (i.e. vessel or line) to be assessed;
    • Describing the purpose and design of the Node by a Process Engineer or an Operation Representative;
    • Identifying a potential Deviation that may occur within that Node using a Guideword and
    • Parameter;
    • Identifying and evaluating the Causes for the Deviations from the design intent;
    • Evaluating the potential Consequences from the Deviations addressed, without considering any
    • Safeguards in place;
    • Identifying any Safeguards in place in order to prevent the failure scenario from occurring or
    • mitigate the Consequences if it occurs;
    • Recommendations are raised to mitigate the Consequences further, wherever required.

The recommendations (action items) identified during the HAZOP Study are included in the HAZOP Report and later tracked to closure using the worksheet. Each recommendation suggested by the HAZOP team was proposed to reduce the risk of a hazard scenario to an acceptable level of risk (as determined by the HAZOP team). Should a recommendation not be implemented, the HAZOP Action sheet must identify an alternate action to achieve the required risk reduction or document the basis for reassessing the risks and determining that the risk without the recommendation is within acceptable levels. It should be noted that the responses to the HAZOP recommendations should provide a clear audit trail including the reasons for taking or not taking action.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the HAZOP study for QatarEnergy’s cooling water system, flow meters, pipelines, degassing stations, and water treatment facilities underscored the critical importance of early risk identification and mitigation. By analyzing potential hazards and operational challenges, the study contributed to enhancing safety and reliability across the facilities. This proactive approach aligns with QatarEnergy’s commitment to safety and operational excellence, ensuring sustainable, efficient, and safe operations across complex water management systems.